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Against the Tiers of  
Constitutional Scrutiny
Joel Alicea and John D. Ohlendorf
This year,  for the first time in nearly a decade, the Supreme Court will return to the subject of the Second Amendment. New 
York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. (NYSRPA) v. City of New York 
concerns a New York City licensing regime that, at the time the Court 
granted review, prohibited the transportation of any firearm outside city 
limits. (The City subsequently changed its licensing regime, perhaps in 
an effort to make the case go away before the Court could rule on the 
merits. It is unclear, at the time we write, whether that tactic will succeed.) 
Although most popular attention will focus on the outcome of the case, 
the long-term significance of NYSRPA could be how the justices arrive at 
that outcome, for NYSRPA poses a challenge to what has become a famil-
iar feature of American constitutional law: the tiers of scrutiny.
The tiers of scrutiny are elements of a method of constitutional anal-
ysis in which courts examine the goal that a law purports to achieve 
and the means the law uses to accomplish it. It is usually said that there 
are three tiers. “Strict scrutiny,” as the name implies, is the most strin-
gent — it places the burden on the government defending a law to, first, 
identify a compelling governmental interest and, second, show that the 
means chosen by the government are narrowly tailored to achieve that 
interest. Laws that discriminate on the basis of race or viewpoint, for 
instance, receive strict scrutiny. So in theory, under current doctrine, a 
law that discriminates on the basis of race would be constitutional if the 
government could meet the two criteria of strict scrutiny. “Intermediate 
scrutiny” is similar to strict scrutiny, but the government’s burden is 
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reduced; generally, the government must show both an important or 
substantial interest, and that the means chosen to advance that interest 
are no more burdensome than reasonably necessary. Laws that dis-
criminate on the basis of sex and content-neutral speech restrictions, 
for example, receive this form of scrutiny. Finally, a law will survive the 
third and lowest tier, “rational-basis review,” if there is any conceivable, 
rational reason supporting the law. Rationality review is highly deferen-
tial and applies to many (perhaps most) economic regulations. 
This three-tiered method of analysis has come to dominate the ju-
risprudence of the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause and the 14th 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. It remains an open question 
whether it will dominate Second Amendment jurisprudence. In District 
of Columbia v. Heller (2008) and McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010), the 
Supreme Court relied on the text, history, and tradition of the Second 
Amendment in establishing an individual right to keep and bear 
arms — striking down the gun laws challenged in those cases not because 
they flunked tiers-of-scrutiny analysis, but for altogether different, seem-
ingly categorical reasons. Yet, in the aftermath of Heller and McDonald, 
federal courts have relied almost exclusively on the tiers of scrutiny to 
analyze Second Amendment cases, almost always purporting to apply 
intermediate scrutiny. The challengers in NYSRPA, by asking the Court 
to repudiate the use of the tiers of scrutiny in Second Amendment cases, 
have opened the way to reconsidering the legitimacy and continuing vi-
ability of the tiers-of-scrutiny framework for the first time in decades. 
That framework ought to be abandoned. The tiers of scrutiny have no 
basis in the text or original meaning of the Constitution. They emerged 
as a political solution invented by the justices to navigate internal fac-
tions at the Supreme Court, and they do not withstand critical analysis 
even on their own terms. Not only do they have no place in Second 
Amendment jurisprudence; they have no place in American consti-
tutional law. The Roberts Court would have few accomplishments of 
greater significance than the repudiation of the tiers of scrutiny and the 
reassertion of a method of constitutional analysis based on the text, his-
tory, and tradition of the Constitution.
the Curious history of the tiers of sCrutiny
Today, analysis of constitutional questions through the lens of the tiers 
of scrutiny is commonplace, part of the unquestioned backdrop of 
N ational Affairs  ·  Fall 2019
74
constitutional law. Yet, despite its familiarity, tiers-of-scrutiny analysis 
is in fact a relative latecomer to American constitutional law, dating 
back no earlier than the mid-20th century. Understanding the origins of 
the tiers of scrutiny is essential to understanding the hollowness of their 
claim to constitutional dominance.
At the time of the founding, American courts did not use “strict 
scrutiny” or “rational-basis review” to sift the constitutionality of fed-
eral or state laws; instead, they engaged in the more mundane task of 
attempting to determine the scope of constitutional rights and legitimate 
governmental powers. As Harvard professor Richard Fallon states in his 
article “Strict Judicial Scrutiny,” “Through most of constitutional his-
tory, the Court conceived its task as marking the conceptual boundaries 
that defined spheres of state and congressional power on the one hand 
and of private rights on the other.”
This method is well illustrated by Chief Justice John Marshall’s 
landmark opinion upholding the first Bank of the United States in the 
1819 case McCulloch v. Maryland. As Marshall saw the case, the consti-
tutionality of the bank, and of Maryland’s attempt to tax it, was to be 
determined by demarcating “the conflicting powers of the government 
of the Union and of its members, as marked in th[e] constitution.” And 
the great chief justice sought to limn these boundaries through textual 
and conceptual analysis: inquiry into the words of the constitutional 
text, as understood in “common usage,” and explication of the nature 
of sovereignty, taxation, and the federal union itself. Indeed, Marshall 
explicitly prescinded from the type of policy analysis emblematic of the 
tiers of scrutiny — the weighing of the importance of legislative ends 
and the sufficiency of legislative means. “[W]here [a challenged] law is 
not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any of the objects en-
trusted to the government,” he insisted, “to undertake here to inquire 
into the degree of its necessity, would be to pass the line which circum-
scribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground. This 
court disclaims all pretensions to such a power.”
Such judicial modesty was not to last. For complex reasons having 
to do in part with the rise of progressivism at the beginning of the 
20th century, the vision of the judicial role reflected in McCulloch came 
under assault, creating a legal environment that eventually led to the 
development of the tiers of scrutiny. A deferential test resembling what 
we now call “rational-basis review” was the first to emerge, establishing 
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itself in the aftermath of the New Deal (though rationality review has its 
origins in the late 19th century). But it was not until mid-century, when 
the Court began to apply a form of heightened scrutiny, that an analy-
sis recognizable as a tiers-of-scrutiny approach took shape. As Professor 
Stephen Siegel explains in “The Origin of the Compelling State Interest 
Test and Strict Scrutiny,” the leading historical account of the rise of the 
tiers of scrutiny, the interest-balancing approach that ultimately devel-
oped into the strict-scrutiny test “was established in First Amendment 
litigation in the late 1950s and early 1960s.” 
At that time, the Supreme Court was bitterly divided on free-speech 
issues between the First Amendment minimalists (justices Frankfurter, 
Harlan, and Clark) who were inclined to “balance” the interest in free 
expression against the government’s countervailing interests in suppress-
ing it, and the First Amendment absolutists (justices Black and Douglas) 
who sought to enforce the Free Speech Clause’s protections categorically. 
Significantly, the “compelling-interest” standard was pioneered by the 
minimalists, who saw it as a means of balancing away the Free Speech 
Clause’s command that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech” (emphasis added). The tiers of scrutiny were thus 
born as a means to evade the categorical language of the Free Speech 
Clause, not to faithfully implement it. 
The notion that the government may justify infringing a con-
stitutional right if it has a “compelling” interest first appeared in 
arch-minimalist Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire, a case overturning the conviction of a New Hampshire 
college professor for refusing to answer questions during a state inves-
tigation of subversive activities. In cases involving academic freedom, 
Justice Frankfurter wrote, the government may act only “for reasons 
that are exigent and obviously compelling.” And while the 1957 decision 
in Sweezy was a rare victory for First Amendment rights during the Red 
Scare, Justice Frankfurter’s formulation was swiftly embraced by his 
fellow minimalists on the Court as a means of upholding restrictions on 
free expression. Justice Clark’s 1959 opinion for the Court in Uphaus v. 
Wyman, for example, upheld the contempt conviction of the director 
of a leftist summer camp for refusing to cooperate in a similar state 
legislative investigation, reasoning that “the governmental interest in 
self-preservation is sufficiently compelling to subordinate the interest in 
associational privacy” of suspected subversives.
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In 1962, however, the First Amendment tide turned, due to a series 
of membership changes on the Court that gave the pro-speech block 
a working majority. For contingent and largely political reasons, the 
task of reorienting the Court’s First Amendment doctrine fell to Justice 
Brennan. Brennan spurned the categorical approach advocated by Black, 
instead latching on to Frankfurter’s “compelling-interest” formulation 
as a way of bridging the gap between the Court’s various factions. 
The key move came in NAACP v. Button, a 1963 case involving an 
attempt by Virginia officials to use state legal-ethics laws to prevent the 
NAACP’s lawyers from engaging in school-desegregation litigation in 
the commonwealth. While conceding that Virginia had a “valid . . . inter-
est” in regulating the practice of law within its borders, Justice Brennan 
wrote for the Court’s new pro-speech majority that the “decisions of this 
Court, have consistently held that only a compelling state interest . . . can 
justify limiting First Amendment freedoms.” And while this compel-
ling-interest formulation was the same one used by justices Frankfurter, 
Harlan, and Clark to allow speech regulations only a few years earlier, 
Justice Brennan had quite obviously poured new wine into the old wine-
skin: Henceforth, the compelling-interest test would become known as 
one of the most exacting tests in constitutional law. 
Justice Brennan’s 1963 opinion in Sherbert v. Verner adopted the same 
analysis under the Free Exercise Clause. His decision in Shapiro v. Thompson 
employed the test to invalidate welfare statutes in Connecticut and the 
District of Columbia on equal-protection grounds. And, as Siegel recounts, 
“From there its spread within equal protection analysis, and throughout 
general legal consciousness, was rapid.” The tiers-of-scrutiny approach had 
gone from a formulation designed by judicial minimalists to uphold re-
strictions on free expression to the Warren Court’s dominant method of 
muscularly protecting its favored constitutional rights. Yet, this revolution 
in constitutional law happened not for reasons of principle and fidelity 
to the original meaning of the Constitution; it happened for reasons of 
contingency and political expediency.
originalism and the tiers of sCrutiny
For those who believe that the Constitution should be interpreted ac-
cording to the meaning it had when it was enacted, this history of the 
tiers of scrutiny provides a good and sufficient reason for rejecting them 
(leaving aside considerations of stare decisis, to which we will return 
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later). While it is logically conceivable that the original meaning of one 
or more constitutional provisions could itself require a balancing ap-
proach akin to the tiers of scrutiny, two features of the historical account 
just described make it extraordinarily unlikely that the tiers-of-scrutiny 
analysis is part of the original meaning of the Constitution. First, this 
mode of analysis was not applied at the founding. Indeed, strict scrutiny 
did not come into being until 1957. And while rational-basis review can 
be traced back slightly earlier, no one believes that rationality review 
would constitute a viable framework for constitutional analysis on its 
own, without strict or intermediate scrutiny available to provide more 
meaningful review in at least some cases. Second, the tiers of scrutiny 
developed as an essentially political expedient, not as a good-faith ef-
fort to recover the original understanding of the constitutional text. 
As Professor Fallon has said, strict-scrutiny analysis — and therefore 
tiers-of-scrutiny analysis — lacks “any foundation in the Constitution’s 
original understanding.”
Sometimes, however, courts develop jurisprudential tests that, while 
not required by the original meaning of the Constitution, are nonethe-
less consistent with it and help courts apply the Constitution to specific 
fact patterns. Some originalist scholars — such as Keith Whittington, 
Randy Barnett, and Lawrence Solum — call this form of constitutional 
analysis “constitutional construction” and distinguish it from the pro-
cess of uncovering the original meaning of the text, which they call 
“constitutional interpretation.” Might the tiers of scrutiny potentially 
be justified as a permissible “construction” of the constitutional rights 
they are used to enforce?
The short answer is “no,” because they are not consistent with the 
original meaning of the text. It is in the very nature of the tiers of scru-
tiny that they contradict the constitutional provisions in question, by 
purporting to find those rights “outweighed” by the government’s inter-
est in violating them.
While tiers-of-scrutiny analysis is not a naked “cost-benefit” test, it 
is a balancing inquiry, even if the balancing is structured into distinct 
stages. After all, scrutiny analysis generally begins only after the court 
has determined that the challenged restriction does indeed fall within 
the scope of the constitutional right in question. Thus, the avowed pur-
pose of the inquiry — even in the form of rational-basis review — is 
to determine when that right has been validly “outweighed” by the 
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government’s interest in suppressing it. And there lies the root diffi-
culty, for the Constitution does not provide a ranking or hierarchy of 
constitutional values and governmental interests, many of which appear 
incommensurable. The scrutiny analysis therefore asks judges to impose 
on the Constitution a hierarchy of values and interests that — due to 
their incommensurability — is not objectively justifiable. 
At this point, some may try to turn this interest-balancing defect into 
a justification. If Chief Justice Marshall was right that the Constitution 
must be “adapted to the various crises of human affairs,” it cannot be 
ruled out that some of these crises will be so acute that the government’s 
compelling interest in taking action outweighs the value of any constitu-
tional restrictions that stand in the way. Similarly, looking at the point 
from the other direction, some scholars have argued that “balancing” 
is a necessary component of a just regime, since, as Harvard professor 
Vicki Jackson puts the point, it is “a principle and . . . goal of constitu-
tional government” that “larger harms imposed by government should 
be justified by more weighty reasons.”
What unites these two arguments for judicial balancing is a kind 
of perfectionism, a fairy-tale constitutionalism in which every consti-
tutional dispute has a happy-ever-after ending that can be discovered 
by judges on a case-by-case basis. This impulse is contrary not only to 
originalism but to the very nature of American-style constitutionalism. 
The basic premise of a written constitution, at least in the American 
tradition, is that due to some combination of uncertainty about the 
nature and content of justice, disagreement over its demands, or skepti-
cism that future government actors can be trusted to pursue them, those 
future officials must be bound by an external, objectively discernible set 
of restraints that are established in advance. A theory of constitutional 
practice that promises happy-ever-after endings in every case — and em-
powers judges to achieve them via balancing tests — is in fundamental 
conflict with such a regime. As Columbia professor Henry Monaghan 
observed nearly four decades ago, we do not have “a perfect constitu-
tion” that always achieves the normatively best outcome. A society 
capable of drafting and implementing such a document would have no 
need of it.
Some have sought to avoid these objections by constructing an alter-
native theory of the tiers of scrutiny, casting the inquiry as a means of 
preventing the government from pre-textually pursuing constitutionally 
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illegitimate motives or purposes. Thus, Professor John Hart Ely famously 
justified strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause as “a way 
of ‘flushing out’ unconstitutional motivation.” Then-professor Kagan 
offered a similar theory in the First Amendment context. As Ely ex-
plained, the idea is that the “interest” prong prevents the government 
from justifying the challenged law by pointing to sanitized goals “so 
unimportant that you have to suspect it’s a pretext that didn’t actually 
generate the choice.” The “tailoring” prong ensures that the interest put 
forward by the government was its genuine motivation — on the theory 
that “[t]here is only one goal the classification is likely to fit” closely 
enough to pass muster, “and that is the goal the legislators actually had 
in mind.”
But even assuming that the original meaning of constitutional provi-
sions like the First Amendment proscribe certain motives (rather than 
certain actions or outcomes), this theory cannot justify the tiers of scru-
tiny. Even if application of the scrutiny tests will occasionally succeed in 
“smoking out” illicit government motives for the reasons Ely described, 
the inquiry is remarkably ill-suited to the task. In many cases, the tiers of 
scrutiny will result in the invalidation of laws that were in fact motivated 
by the genuine desire to pursue legitimate objectives the government 
believed were compelling. And in many others, illicitly motivated laws 
will nonetheless be upheld because the government chose its pretext 
carefully, enacting a law that passes the scrutiny gauntlet despite its sin-
ister purpose. In the end, if certain constitutional rights really do forbid 
otherwise-valid government action motivated by illegitimate purposes, 
the way to enforce them is to ask whether a challenged government act is 
motivated by an illegitimate purpose. The courts already directly inquire 
whether the government has acted for impermissible purposes in many 
contexts; there is no reason to resort to the tiers of scrutiny as a ham-
fisted way of asking the same question.
failing on their own terms
But one need not be an originalist to reject the tiers of scrutiny; any good-
faith interpreter of the Constitution can — and should — just as readily 
condemn them. That is because the tiers of scrutiny lack the essential char-
acteristic of any jurisprudential test whose aim is the faithful application of 
the law: serving as a meaningful guide to legal analysis. Instead, each step 
of the scrutiny process is marked by indeterminacy and manipulability.
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Consider, as Fallon has correctly pointed out, that “there will often be 
an important ‘level of generality’ question involving purportedly com-
pelling governmental interests.” For example, in the statutory context, 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act requires courts to apply a form 
of strict scrutiny to federal laws that substantially burden the exercise 
of religion. When the Obama administration was defending its contra-
ception mandate, it consistently described the governmental interest 
in broad terms, such as “public health” and “gender equality.” These 
formulations made the government’s interest sound more compelling 
than those framed at a lower level of generality, such as “providing free 
contraceptives to employees of certain types of employers offering cer-
tain types of health-insurance plans.” 
The manipulability of the first step of the analysis, in turn, infects the 
second step’s tailoring requirement. If the government’s interest is stated 
broadly, there will likely be more ways of achieving that interest than if 
it is stated narrowly, which makes it less likely that the government can 
show the necessary tailoring of its interest to its chosen means. The con-
traception mandate again provides a case in point. If the government’s 
interest had been stated narrowly — providing free contraceptives to 
employees of a particular type of employer — the mandate would have 
had a better (though perhaps not convincing) claim to being the only 
way to accomplish it. (Of course, this raises a separate manipulability 
problem: defining the interest to precisely match the chosen means.) But 
cast at a relatively high level of generality — as achieving broader access 
to contraceptives — it seemed likely that the interest could have been 
achieved in ways other than forcing employers with religious objections 
to provide the contraceptives for free. Indeed, this is precisely why the 
Supreme Court held in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (2014) that the 
contraception mandate failed strict scrutiny as applied to closely held 
corporations with religious objections. 
Thus, in many cases, to decide the level of generality is to decide 
the case. Yet, as Fallon has observed, despite the importance of this 
level-of-generality inquiry, the Supreme Court has never explained how 
the level of generality of the government’s interest is to be determined. 
The Court’s failure to provide an answer to this critical question is no 
surprise: There is no answer. Courts forced to choose between charac-
terizing the government’s interest as “public health,” “increased access 
to contraceptives,” or “free access to a particular type of contraceptive 
Alicea and Ohlendorf  ·  Against the Tiers of Constitutional Scrutiny
81
for employees with a certain type of insurance” simply have no prin-
cipled way of making the determination. 
But even if they did, the tiers of scrutiny would still pose intractable 
problems for the rule of law. How, for instance, is a court to determine 
whether an interest is important or compelling? The Court has tended 
to treat the question as a normative one reserved for its own judgment, 
but that makes the constitutionality of governmental action dependent 
on each judge’s own subjective assessment of questions that can only be 
described as quintessentially political. And when the meaning of con-
stitutional provisions rests on a judge’s controversial political decisions, 
the courts become no more than a continuation of politics by other 
means, a way in which one faction comes to dominate another through 
repeated 5-4 majority opinions. This makes the resolution of controver-
sial constitutional questions difficult for the losing side to accept, since 
the judicial decision rests on political judgments rather than law, which 
undermines the very purpose of American-style constitutionalism.
When we reach the tailoring prong, the situation does not improve. 
Whether a challenged law will, in fact, achieve its stated goal is often 
a contested empirical question, as is the question of whether there are 
other, less-restrictive means of achieving the same end. That does not 
mean that there is no right answer to such questions, but there is some-
thing farcical about a federal judge hearing testimony about fraught and 
quintessentially legislative questions and pronouncing his conclusions 
as settled fact. As Justice Alito observed in his dissent in United States v. 
Windsor (2013), “[o]nly an arrogant legal culture that has lost all apprecia-
tion of its own limitations could take such a suggestion seriously.” 
tiers of sCrutiny and Stare DeciSiS
Even if the argument against the tiers of scrutiny is strong, there re-
mains the question of what role stare decisis should play in considering 
whether to abandon them. For some justices, the stare decisis question 
should be an easy one. Last term, Justice Thomas authored a concurring 
opinion in Gamble v. United States in which he argued that the Court 
should not adhere to precedents that, under an originalist analysis, are 
“demonstrably erroneous,” regardless of any other considerations. As 
shown above, the tiers of scrutiny have no apparent basis in the text or 
original meaning of the Constitution and were simply adopted as a po-
litical compromise. Under the standard of Justice Thomas’s concurrence 
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in Gamble, that is the end of the analysis, and the tiers of scrutiny should 
be set aside. 
Other justices take a more robust view of stare decisis, though the 
Court has consistently emphasized that stare decisis “is at its weakest 
when [the Court] interpret[s] the Constitution.” Although there is no 
definitive list of stare decisis factors, in its most recent cases overruling 
prior precedents, such as Knick v. Township of Scott, Pennsylvania (2019), 
the Court has looked at “the quality of [the precedent’s] reasoning, the 
workability of the rule it established, its consistency with other related 
decisions . . . and reliance on the decision.” All of these factors favor get-
ting rid of the tiers of scrutiny.
As recounted above, the tiers of scrutiny did not emerge out of a 
careful analysis of the Constitution’s text or original meaning. Chief 
Justice Roberts once observed that “these standards that apply in the 
First Amendment just kind of developed over the years as sort of bag-
gage that the First Amendment picked up.” Indeed, the Court has never 
provided a systematic analysis of the basis for, or a sustained defense 
of, the tiers of scrutiny. It is not hard to see why: The tiers of scrutiny 
have no apparent basis in the Constitution’s text or history, and they 
arose through political compromise, not sound legal reasoning. Like 
the doctrinal rule the majority reversed in Knick, “[b]ecause of its shaky 
foundations, the [tiers-of-scrutiny framework] has been a rule in search 
of a justification for over [60] years,” and while various scholars have 
offered potential justifications, “[t]he fact that the justification for the 
[tiers of scrutiny] continues to evolve is another factor undermining the 
force of stare decisis.”
Nor are the tiers of scrutiny workable. In Janus v. American Federation 
of State, County, and Municipal Employees (2018), the Court overruled a 
First Amendment precedent dating back over four decades. It observed, 
citing earlier opinions by justices Scalia and Kennedy, that “each part of 
the [precedent’s] test ‘involves a substantial judgment call,’ rendering the 
test ‘altogether malleable’ and ‘no[t] principled.’” The tiers-of-scrutiny 
analysis is no less malleable, and no more principled; as shown above, 
its every step is marked by manipulable, arbitrary assessments leading 
to indeterminate outcomes.
And just as the tiers-of-scrutiny analysis leads to inconsistencies across 
cases, it is inconsistent with the approach the Court has taken to other 
provisions of the Bill of Rights. As then-judge Kavanaugh observed in 
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a dissenting opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller (2011), “Strict and 
intermediate scrutiny tests are not employed in the Court’s interpreta-
tion and application of many other individual rights provisions of the 
Constitution.” From the Confrontation Clause to the Establishment 
Clause, the Court routinely strikes down — or sustains — challenged 
government restrictions without asking whether they are tailored to 
achieving the government’s interests. Because the scrutiny analysis is 
foreign to the great bulk of the Bill of Rights anyway, there is no reason 
for retaining it in the few enclaves where it does apply.
Finally, just as in Janus, the tiers-of-scrutiny analysis “does not pro-
vide ‘a clear or easily applicable standard, so arguments for reliance 
based on its clarity are misplaced.’” There can be no serious reliance on 
such a manipulable and unpredictable test. While throwing out the tiers 
of scrutiny might cause distress to those law professors who would have 
to revise their syllabi, it is hard to imagine what other reliance interests 
would be affected. 
replaCing the tiers of sCrutiny
And so the question arises: What should replace the tiers of scrutiny? At 
a general level, the answer is straightforward: Any sound jurisprudential 
test must reflect the text, history, and tradition of the constitutional 
provision at issue. That is necessarily a provision-by-provision — and per-
haps even a context-by-context — analysis. Fully answering the question 
would thus entail a comprehensive historical description of the original 
meaning of every constitutional right where the tiers of scrutiny are 
currently employed, a task far beyond the scope of this essay. 
The Court can, however, start by refusing to extend the tiers of 
scrutiny to provisions that heretofore have not been subject to them, 
especially where a test that is faithful to the original meaning is read-
ily available. The most obvious and immediate example is the Second 
Amendment. As Justice Kavanaugh wrote when he was on the D.C. 
Circuit, the exhaustive historical analyses of Heller and McDonald show 
that the Second Amendment, when properly interpreted, requires that 
only “traditional, ‘longstanding’ regulations” of specific firearms or in-
dividuals are constitutional. Whatever claim it may have in doctrinal 
areas where it currently prevails — and where alternative, original-
ist tests have not yet been developed — scrutiny analysis as of yet has 
no claim on the Second Amendment, and the Court should take the 
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opportunity in NYSRPA to endorse the “text, history, and tradition” 
approach described by Justice Kavanaugh and firmly reject application 
of the tiers of scrutiny. 
For those provisions already colonized by the tiers of scrutiny, the pru-
dent course would be to reclaim constitutional territory in stages, which 
would allow the Court sufficient time to do the difficult historical and 
theoretical work of developing replacement tests grounded in original-
ism. The Court is already doing something like this in the Establishment 
Clause context. In Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), the Court adopted a sub-
jective, ahistorical test for Establishment Clause cases that has been 
subject to relentless criticism from scholars and jurists ever since. But in 
recent years, the Court has begun to roll back Lemon’s domain. Just last 
term, a majority of the justices in American Legion v. American Humanist 
Association rejected the applicability of the Lemon test at least to cases in-
volving “religious references or imagery in public monuments, symbols, 
mottos, displays, and ceremonies,” relying instead on the long tradition 
of accepting the constitutionality of these religious references and images. 
The Court has shown that it knows how to chip away at an ahistorical 
jurisprudential test and replace it, bit by bit, with one grounded in the 
original meaning of the Constitution. 
The same could be done in the areas governed by the tiers of scrutiny, 
such as the Free Speech Clause. For example, in his separate opinion 
in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims 
Board, Justice Kennedy argued that the tiers of scrutiny have “no real 
or legitimate place when the Court considers the straightforward ques-
tion whether the State may enact a burdensome restriction of speech 
based on content only, apart from any considerations of time, place, and 
manner or the use of public forums.” Such laws, in Justice Kennedy’s 
view, were per se unconstitutional. If historical analysis bears Justice 
Kennedy’s suggestion out, the Court could adopt his proposed categori-
cal rule; and over time, the Court could evaluate other types of speech 
restrictions as well to see how they should be treated under the original 
meaning of the Free Speech Clause. In this way, the Court could go 
about the labor of burrowing out the tiers of scrutiny one spadeful at a 
time — carefully shoring up the excavation with sound constitutional 
timber each step of the way. 
If last term is any indication, the Supreme Court is poised to re-evaluate 
doctrines and tests whose tenuous reasoning and dubious origins make 
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them ripe for reconsideration. It could start nowhere better than with the 
tiers of scrutiny. They are not grounded in the text or original meaning of 
the Constitution; they were adopted for political reasons; they are inher-
ently manipulable and indeterminate; they place judges in the position of 
making controversial policy and political judgments; and they have no 
refuge in stare decisis. The Court has the opportunity in NYSRPA to stop 
the spread of this ahistorical and unmoored analysis to new constitutional 
contexts. It should do so, and begin the process of eliminating the scrutiny 
tests from constitutional jurisprudence for good. 
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